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8 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE HEARTLAND: 
THE CASE FOR LEGISLATIVE MINIMALISM IN 
CRAFTING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 
Ian C. Bartrum* † 
In Varnum v. Brien, decided April 3rd of this year, the Iowa Supreme 
Court unanimously struck down the state’s statutory ban on same-sex mar-
riage. In a remarkably clear and thoughtful opinion, Justice Mark Cady 
explored in depth the immutability of sexual identity and the appropriate 
standard of judicial review for legislative classifications based on sexual 
orientation—adopting (for now) an intermediate level of scrutiny. The deci-
sion marked the first significant legal victory for same-sex marriage outside 
of New England (with the exception of a short-term success in Hawaii), and 
served notice that the gay rights movement—once thought compelling only 
among northeastern “liberal elites”—may be carving out a foothold in 
America’s heartland. As events in Vermont and Connecticut have demon-
strated, however, constructing the civil apparatus of same-sex marriage 
requires a deft legislative hand: there are, for example, complex intersec-
tions of state and federal law (tax, healthcare, etc.) to consider; and, perhaps 
more significantly, there are inevitable boundary disputes along the constitu-
tional border between equal protection and religious liberty. Both of these 
states have restructured their tax code to account for same-sex couples 
without reference to federal law, and both have adopted statutory language 
that narrowly exempts religious groups from otherwise applicable require-
ments of anti-discrimination law. While Iowa can probably look to the 
northeast for help in resolving the former complications, recent polls indi-
cate that Midwesterners tend to take their religion more seriously than do 
modern New Englanders, and so the state will likely have to cut its own trail 
through the thickets of religious freedom. 
Indeed, the battles have already begun. At least two groups of academic 
signatories have sent letters to Iowa urging broad exemptions or “accom-
modations” for those whose religious convictions might prevent them from 
taking any part in same-sex marriage ceremonies. Carl Esbeck and others 
ask the state to exempt all religious denominations, organizations, and indi-
viduals from liability under state anti-discrimination laws “for refusing to 
provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privi-
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leges related to the solemnization of any marriage . . . [which violates] sin-
cerely held religious beliefs.” What’s more, Esbeck suggests that such 
individuals and groups should remain free to deny the very validity of these 
marriages. Perhaps most troubling, Esbeck’s proposal would extend these 
same accommodations to state and municipal employees who might be 
asked to officiate at such ceremonies or otherwise treat these marriages as 
valid. The letter does suggest two exceptions—presumably in recognition of 
Iowa’s many small towns—which would remove the exemption in those 
cases where finding a suitable alternative service provider or government 
employee would impose a “substantial hardship” on same-sex couples.  
Another group, fronted by Douglas Laycock, heartily endorsed Esbeck’s 
proposal as striking the right balance between potentially antagonistic inter-
ests: “It is obviously better for traditional religious believers; on a few 
moments reflection, it is also better for the same-sex couples. Because it is 
better for both sides, it is better for Iowa.” While Laycock acknowledges 
that Justice Cady’s opinion leaves religious organizations free to define mar-
riage according to their own traditions, he worries that the Court has not 
adequately addressed all the potential conflicts that might arise. In particu-
lar, he laments that “the opinion had no occasion to consider the rights of 
religious individuals who facilitate weddings or provide services to help 
sustain marriages.” There remains, he suggests, a real danger that the state 
may “inflict serious harm” on such people by forcing them to work with, or 
for, same-sex couples. Further, Laycock argues that the proposed exemp-
tions would protect individual religious liberty without intruding 
significantly on the right to same-sex marriage. 
It is perhaps tempting to see these efforts as the desperate rearguard ac-
tion of retreating “traditionalists,” but, in truth, not all those who advocate 
strong exemptions for religious dissent are ideologically opposed to same-
sex marriage. Laycock insists that he and his signatories support same-sex 
marriage and regard Varnum as “a great advance for human liberty,” but 
nonetheless worry that the potential oppression of religious believers is no 
better than the oppression Iowa gays have recently overcome. To this end, 
he urges the state to avoid “careless or overly aggressive implementation” of 
gay marriage rights. And while I might characterize myself as on the other 
end of the spectrum—I am certainly no “traditionalist”—I, too, can appreci-
ate the deep importance of the liberties specified in the First Amendment. 
They are indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, our first freedoms. I cannot 
help but wonder, however, whether it is actually Esbeck’s proposed exemp-
tions that are careless and overly aggressive in this instance. Leaving aside 
the fact that his argument seems to open the theoretical door to discrimina-
tion more generally—after all, people might find serving gays qua gays just 
as objectionable as serving gays as married couples—Esbeck’s proposal 
exacerbates the constitutional problem by failing adequately to distinguish 
between civil and religious marriage. Moreover, his solution errs by sweep-
ing both easy and hard cases into the same legislative loophole. I would 
urge a more modest and calculated approach. 
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First, there are the easy cases. It seems relatively clear that no religious 
institution should have to perform or recognize same-sex marriages. Mar-
riage as sanctified by the Catholic Church (for example) is a religious 
institution, governed by religious principles. The state has no more business 
telling a church how to conduct this ritual than it does any other. The same 
rule should apply to religiously affiliated organizations generally (schools, 
charities, fraternal organizations, and so on): they may set whatever stan-
dards they see fit for their own institutions. On the other hand, it seems 
equally clear that state and municipal officials must perform and recognize 
same-sex marriages if they are to remain government employees. These 
marriages are civil institutions, governed by state law, and those civil actors 
who carry out the law must obey it themselves. Thus, no individual acting in 
his or her capacity as a state official can refuse to solemnize or otherwise 
recognize a civil marriage as the state defines that institution. This, of 
course, is the same principle that governs officials generally, notwithstand-
ing potential religious objections to other enacted laws. Seems simple, 
right? In these cases, Vermont and Connecticut both seemed to think so: 
both states narrowly exempted clergy, religious organizations, and relig-
iously affiliated fraternal benefits societies from at least some portions of 
their respective civil rights law; and neither state has taken the extraordinary 
step of exempting state or municipal actors. For the most part, these exemp-
tions have defused much of the religious protest, and it is not clear that any 
of the further “implications” that Laycock worries about have yet material-
ized on the ground. 
But Laycock rightly points out that there are potential hard cases out 
there. While individuals with deeply held convictions of faith are entitled to 
exercise their religion freely, this freedom does not usually insulate them 
from laws of general application. Anti-discrimination laws present a special 
challenge to the general rule, however, as religious practices often require 
active discrimination between, for example, insiders and outsiders; the sa-
cred and the secular; or the righteous and the sinful. Does this mean we 
should permit racial discrimination based on religious conviction? Probably 
not; in Bob Jones University v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court con-
cluded that preventing such discrimination—at least in the educational 
context—is the kind of “overriding governmental interest” that justifies a 
burden on religious freedom. But homosexuality is a different matter, or at 
least it has been treated differently for a very long time. No one doubts that 
there are well-established religious traditions that view homosexual conduct 
as wrong, even if we might doubt the wisdom of such doctrine; and protect-
ing gays is certainly not (yet) the “fundamental national public policy” that 
racial equality has become.  
Indeed, in this sense—and this sense only—we might see the same-sex 
marriage issue as somewhat closer to the controversy over abortion, where 
we exempt service providers with religious objections from some require-
ments of the Civil Rights Act. While abortion and same-sex marriage clearly 
present different kinds of moral questions, both issues do generate well-
recognized religious objections, and neither practice has yet settled into our 
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law beyond the reach of substantial controversy. If one is intellectually hon-
est, establishing the theoretical limits of individual religious liberty in these 
contexts is quite difficult indeed. And the legislative task is all the more dif-
ficult because it is so hard to predict precisely what shape—if any—these 
theoretical problems may take in the real world.  
Fortunately, we have a legal mechanism for such circumstances—the 
common law. Rather than try to settle the boundaries of religious freedom in 
a speculative, forward-looking statute, Iowa should allow its courts to de-
velop the law on a case-by-case basis. Laycock suggests that such an 
approach only invites “expensive litigation”, but in truth it seems unlikely, 
as a practical matter, that the question of individual service providers will 
generate many actual cases or controversies: after all, who wants a disap-
proving chef to cater their happy day? Or, to put a legal point on the 
question, who is the likely plaintiff? It is difficult to imagine a same-sex 
couple going to court to force an individual to provide wedding services; 
particularly when such a suit might produce an unwelcome precedent. 
Moreover, the free market is generally fairly efficient at providing services 
to those that seek them. But in the event such disputes do arise, they are 
probably best settled by weighing the particular facts and policies at issue—
the sincerity of the religious objection, the gravity of the hardships imposed, 
and so on. Courts are well-equipped to craft and evaluate these kinds of bal-
ancing tests governing constitutional rights, and thus the legislature should 
leave the question of private religious exemptions for later judicial interpre-
tation. By reserving judgment on this thorny issue, the Iowa legislature can 
avoid creating a political firestorm—which same-sex marriage opponents 
would undoubtedly welcome—out of an issue that seems likely to have little 
real-world significance. This, I suggest, represents a more cautious and pru-
dential approach to the hard cases that same-sex marriage presents, and it 
has the added benefit of utilizing the particular structural strengths our dif-
ferent legal institutions bring to bear. Just for kicks, we might even call such 
an approach “legislative minimalism.” 
